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The Politics of Service Delivery Reform 
Development and Change Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2004 
Richard Batley 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article identifies the leaders, the supporters and the resisters of public service 
reform. It adopts a principal–agent framework, comparing reality with an ‘ideal’ 
situation in which citizens are the principals over political policy-makers as their 
agents, and policy-makers are the principals over public service officials as their 
agents. Reform in most developing countries is complicated by an additional set of 
external actors — international financial institutions and donors. In practice, 
international agencies and core government officials usually act as the ‘principals’ in 
the determination of reforms. The analysis identifies the interests involved in reform, 
indicating how the balance between them is affected by institutional and sectoral 
factors. Organizational reforms, particularly in the social sectors, present greater 
difficulties than first generation economic policy reforms. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This article asks whether the policy-makers and citizens of developing countries have 
been instrumental in demanding, designing and directing reforms in service delivery 
systems. It offers some explanation of the interests and institutions that have stood for 
or against reform in different national contexts and in different service sectors. The 
analysis is of the process of reform rather than its outcomes or effects.
1
   
The article first refers to the case studies on which the analysis is based. It then 
follows an argument that moves from the general to the particular, beginning with 
some broad considerations about the sort of political stakes that public service reform 
measures may raise. It goes on to suggest that, in the institutional context of 
developing countries, reforms may have special political salience. A principal–agent 
framework is then used to identify the actors, their interests and relationships in the 
reform of some particular services in some particular countries. The theoretical 
models adopted will be explained at each stage; the intention here is to use these 
models rather than to test them or to explore the theoretical literature.  
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 A more comprehensive analysis will be published in Batley and Larbi (forthcoming). 
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THE RESEARCH MATERIAL 
 
The analysis of actors which follows is based principally on recent research in four 
core countries — Ghana, Zimbabwe, India and Sri Lanka — and in several reference 
countries where more limited research was undertaken — Bolivia, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Kenya, and Thailand.
2
 The research project examined experiences in these 
countries during the 1990s of reform in four service sectors: urban water supply, 
curative health, business development and agricultural marketing services. This article 
focuses on water and health, making limited reference to the other two sectors for 
comparative purposes. In addition to the primary case-study research which underlies 
the analysis, the article also draws on the limited available work on the service reform 
process, particularly the recent work of Grindle (2001, 2003) and Nelson (2000) who 
have analysed social sector reform processes in Latin America. 
The core countries were chosen because of their different public sector 
traditions and experience of economic and state reform. Ghana and Sri Lanka came 
earlier to adjustment than Zimbabwe and India, whereas the latter have had more 
stable, classical public administrations. The East Asian and Latin American cases 
were selected because of their relatively deeper involvement in the ‘destatization’ of 
their economies, and because of their different administrative traditions and relatively 
higher levels of market development.  
The four service sectors — health care, urban drinking water, agricultural 
marketing and business development — were selected for a number of reasons: (1) 
because of their impact on the livelihoods of the poor; (2) because they offer different 
conditions for the exercise of control by ‘principals’ (citizens, policy-makers) over 
service delivery ‘agents’; and (3) because they present different ‘technical’ cases for 
government intervention given the likelihood and form of possible market failure: 
while none of them are pure ‘public goods’, the sectors can be seen as being on a 
roughly declining scale from a stronger (health) to a weaker (business development) 
case for government involvement. 
The research studied the application in these countries and sectors of the sorts 
of reform that have come to wear the label of the ‘new management’ (Manning, 2001; 
Minogue et al., 1998; Walsh, 1995) which includes such characteristics as: the 
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reduction of governments’ direct role in managing economies and providing services; 
greater reliance on markets, communities and individuals to manage services; the 
adoption by governments of new roles of ‘steering’ (setting policy frameworks, 
regulating and supporting) service providers rather than providing directly; and the 
reform of public management to create incentives for efficiency and effectiveness.  
Table 1 indicates the types of reform that were identified in the four service 
sectors: privatizing and contracting the management of public services; decentralizing 
management to semi-autonomous units within the public sector; the application of 
charges to users of services; and the development of enabling and regulatory roles by 
public agencies. For Ghana and Sri Lanka these were ‘second generation reforms’ that 
followed the earlier thrust during the 1980s to reduce state intervention in the 
management of the economy. For the later reformers, India and Zimbabwe, first and 
second generation reforms were slower and became conflated.  
 
Table 1. Reform Types Analysed by Sector 
 
Type Health Urban Water Business services Agricultural 
marketing 
Decentralizing 
management 
within public 
sector 
Autonomous 
hospitals 
Corporatization 
of utilities 
Autonomous 
agencies 
Corporatization 
of marketing 
boards 
Charging users Charging users Water tariffs Charging for 
technical services 
 
Contracting out Contracting 
ancillary and 
clinical services 
Franchise and 
concession 
 Contracting of 
services 
Other private 
sector 
participation 
 NGO and 
informal 
provision 
Divestiture of state 
textiles 
manufacture 
Liberalization of 
markets 
Enabling 
private sector 
Tax breaks, 
loans, grants and 
subsidies 
 Marketing, advice 
and promotion 
Market 
information 
services 
Regulating 
private sector 
Regulation of 
hospitals, 
professions and 
pharmaceuticals 
Environmental 
and economic 
regulation; 
contracting 
Regulatory control 
and quality 
certification 
Quality 
assurance 
 
 
 
In the case of health care, the main reforms studied were decentralizing 
hospital management, charging user fees, contracting ancillary services from the 
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 The research on which the article is based was funded by DFID between 1996 and 2000, 
under Contract No. CNTR 94 2117A.   
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private sector, and strengthening the governments’ regulatory and enabling roles. In 
urban water, the main reforms comprised corporatizing water utilities, decentralizing 
management, private sector contracting and concessions, and strengthening 
governments’ regulatory roles. The research proceeded in three stages: first, the 
preparation of overviews of international trends in reform of the four sectors; second, 
the country case studies; and third, the development of sectoral and cross-sectoral 
analyses. In addition to the sector case studies, focus group surveys of the experiences 
of health and water service users were undertaken in the four core countries.
3
 
This article is not about the outcome but the process of reform. However, in 
broad terms the research finding was that, while such reforms were often formally 
adopted, they were usually weakly implemented in the core research countries. 
Problems in the reform process were at least partly responsible for poor 
implementation.  
 
POLITICAL STAKES IN THE REFORM OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
 
Underlying the question of who directs the reform process is the question of who 
participates in it at all. Grindle and Thomas (1991) distinguish reforms that become 
matters of wide public mobilization from those that generate responses largely within 
the bureaucratic arena. They argue that the stakes are higher in the first case; 
determined political support is needed to drive them through. In the second case, the 
political stakes are lower; the crucial issues are within the competence and 
compliance of the bureaucracy.  
The factors that Grindle and Thomas identify as determining whether reforms 
become openly political or are managed internally are summarized in Table 2. These 
include the distribution of the concrete costs and benefits of reforms between 
government and sections of the public, and also factors to do with the ‘visibility’ of 
reforms, their administrative complexity, whether public support is required for their 
implementation, and the duration of the process of implementation. So, reforms such 
as the introduction of user fees are likely to become matters of open public debate — 
the benefits are most obviously to the public purse, the costs are to consumers, and the 
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 5 
impact is immediate and visible. Decision-makers therefore confront high political 
stakes in pushing such reforms. 
 
Table 2: The Public and Bureaucratic Arenas of Response and Resistance to Reform 
 
Characteristic of 
reform 
Features of reforms in the 
public arena, requiring 
political support and stability 
Features of reforms in the 
bureaucratic arena, requiring 
bureaucratic compliance 
Dispersal of the costs Costs have wide impact among 
the population 
Costs focus on government 
institutions 
Dispersal of the 
benefits 
Benefits are focused on 
government  
Benefits are not immediately felt 
by bureaucracy and only in long 
term by public 
Technical and 
administrative 
complexity 
Reforms have low administrative 
content and can be done quickly 
Reforms are administratively 
complex 
Level of public 
participation 
Reforms require wide public 
involvement and are ‘visible’ 
Reforms require limited public 
involvement and are ‘invisible’ 
Duration and visibility 
of reform process 
Reforms can be achieved quickly 
and are visible 
Reforms require sustained effort 
with few immediate visible returns 
Examples User fees 
Privatization of services 
Contracting out 
Decentralized management 
 
Source: Adapted from Grindle and Thomas (1991)  
 
 
However, many of the management reforms listed in Table 1, for example 
contracting out or management decentralization, are unlikely to generate a public 
reaction. They are a matter of detailed working out and interaction within the 
government system, requiring a high degree of sustained technical competence and 
commitment. They may have great significance for the population but only in the 
longer term and not in direct and immediate costs or benefits. The arena of reform is 
instead likely to be within the bureaucracy where the interests and behaviour of 
officials and professionals are affected. Grindle and Thomas argue that, in these cases, 
the political stakes are relatively low: the only risk to government is of failure to 
achieve bureaucratic compliance rather than of loss of public support.   
This article suggests a modification of Grindle and Thomas’s argument in two 
main respects. First, as the next section will indicate, there is not such a clear 
distinction between the bureaucratic and public arenas. In weaker political-economies, 
particularly the African cases in this study, the bureaucratic arena is itself highly 
politicized and inter-connected with societal interests; it is where power, employment 
and patronage are concentrated, so the stakes are high. Second, as we will see later in 
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the study, where policy reform is led by external agencies (donors) rather than by 
government, public reaction is likely to have little capacity to influence the course of 
reform.  
 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO REFORM 
 
Reform entails a re-structuring of institutions. It is not just a technical matter of 
finding the best design solution and applying it, although much of the debate about 
the respective roles of state and market in the 1980s and early 1990s proceeded on 
this sort of technical-economistic basis. Nor is reform only a narrowly political 
process of confronting specific interests. An institutional perspective draws attention 
to a more complex reality where political and administrative arrangements embody 
values, behaviour and structures of power (Lane, 2000). This section briefly locates 
the specific reforms in an institutional context of state dominance, weak markets and a 
convention of public sector service delivery affected by fiscal crisis and staff 
demoralization. 
In the case-study countries, the period from the late 1980s until the present has 
been characterized by attempts at extraordinarily radical public sector reform. These 
were at least equal to the previous great period of radical reform in the 1950s and 
1960s in South Asia and Africa (or the 1930s to 1950s in Europe and Latin America) 
which had established the responsibility of the state for social services and economic 
development. The level of ‘pre-reform’ state involvement across the sectors and in the 
African and South Asian countries was, in broad terms, similar. In the industrial 
sector, there was widespread state management of production, justified on infant 
industry or import substitution arguments. In staple food marketing, governments 
typically intervened through marketing and produce boards, on grounds of food 
security, consumer and producer welfare; or, in the case of export crops, on national 
development and tax-raising grounds. Formal urban water supplies were operated by 
direct state or municipal administrations, subsidized on grounds of equity, but 
typically with the poorer sections of the population having least access and often 
having to resort to household action or private markets for their supplies. Similarly, 
formal curative health services were provided by direct public administration, but a 
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commitment to free services went with under-investment and widespread resort by 
citizens to informal or private providers. 
In India, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Zimbabwe, the specific models of state 
provision were traceable to the British colonial inheritance of public administration, 
often with the legislative basis largely unchanged. Post-colonial governments added 
redistributive and nation-building intentions whose interventionism was often 
enhanced by commitments to reversing colonial inequalities, to state socialism and 
national planning. The degree and forms of prior state intervention were not very 
different in the non-anglophone countries referred to in this research: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Venezuela, and non-colonized Thailand. They shared a practically world-
wide convention (from the 1940s to the 1980s) in favour of direct public ownership or 
state management as the preferred models of intervention, regardless of the existence 
of other available instruments. 
Economically, the model of direct state intervention was fragile, being even 
less fiscally sustainable in the face of economic crisis than in the West. However, 
institutionally, it presented strong barriers to change, which have had particular force 
in the poorer developing countries. Although they never achieved the same level of 
inclusiveness of benefits as in the West, the statist model was more deeply ingrained 
in their power structures. On it was constructed a commitment to the responsibility of 
the state with its own constituency of interests in maintaining interventionism: 
politicians and bureaucrats with patronage opportunities, professional staff with 
standards to protect, urban residents enjoying subsidized prices, services and 
employment, and industrialists and farmers with guaranteed but also controlled prices. 
In the poorer countries with weaker market systems, power and privilege were 
determined by state action. To challenge the statist model was almost to challenge the 
foundations of the state and its legitimacy (Sandbrook, 1993).  
The circumstances under which reform was to take place compounded the 
difficulty. The initiating impulse to public sector reform in developing countries (as 
elsewhere) was the economic crisis that became transparent in the early 1980s and 
which, for many, has persisted since then. This has been not only the impulse for reform, 
but also — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America — the difficult context 
of reform. New approaches to public management are being developed in even more 
stressful circumstances than those experienced by reformers in more advanced countries. 
This is true particularly, but not only, in the African countries where, paradoxically, the 
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proposed reforms have often been most radical. Structural adjustment and public sector 
reform have often been delayed until the point that the fiscal crisis is deep and public 
resources exhausted. They have therefore often taken place in the context of already 
rapidly declining public services, a spiral of decline from which it is difficult to recover. 
Moreover, the reforms themselves have usually generated a first impact of increased 
stress and poverty for those sections of the population that had had access to services and 
employment (Batley, 1994). The public administration that was expected to carry out the 
reforms was itself demoralized by a decline in real salaries and by severe cuts in 
numbers, particularly in Africa. Furthermore, many of the reforms were likely to damage 
them further, as ‘government agencies were expected to co-operate in diminishing or 
dismantling their own power’ (Hirschmann, 1993: 114). The climate of change has, 
therefore, often been one of suspicion and resistance, unmatched by support from any 
clear constituency.  
The broad categories of stakeholder in the reform of the management of public 
services can thus be defined as international agencies, governments, politicians, 
officials and the population as citizens and (would-be) consumers. Reforms, which in 
more advanced countries have had relatively low political salience, in poorer and 
weaker government systems were highly politicized. The following sections use a 
broad principal–agency framework to analyse the relationships between the actors 
using the studies of reform in the four sectors named — particularly health and water, 
but also agricultural and business development services. Some reference is also made 
to education. 
 
A PRINCIPAL–AGENT FRAMEWORK 
 
The principal–agent model (Lane, 2000; Stiglitz, 1987; Walsh, 1995) examines 
organizational relationships as a tension between the ‘principal’ who demands a 
service and the ‘agent’ who provides it. The model assumes that actors are motivated 
by rational self-interest. The question, then, is how principals can manage the self-
interest of those empowered to act on their behalf, their agents, so that it is aligned 
with the purposes that they (the principals) wish to achieve. The problem arises not 
just from conflicts of interest but also from the privileged access of the agents to 
information — the problem of asymmetric information. The agents who have been 
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employed to provide a service will tend to use their superior knowledge to divert 
benefits in their own direction. 
 In a democratic polity, the ultimate principals are the citizens, or consumers of 
specific services. In principal–agent theory, they are ‘principals’ in the sense that 
politicians, as agents, seek their mandate from and act as the representatives of the 
public. In their turn, appointed officials are, in theory, the agents of political leaders in 
executing policy. Each has a measure of autonomy and each has their own interests to 
advance. The likelihood of the principal effectively controlling the agent depends on 
how much information the principal has about the performance of the agent, and how 
far the principal can structure the relationship so as to control the agent or give 
incentives so as to make the agent’s interests correspond to the principal’s.  
I adopt this framework as a way of structuring my argument and of arriving at 
some broad conclusions. There are, however, two major limitations. First, I share the 
view of the critics of the principal–agent model (Bøhren, 1998; Dilulio, 1994) that it 
offers only a one-dimensional view of behaviour, ignoring the co-operative aspects of 
social life. Second, my own evidence is limited and has here to be summarized, often 
eliding over differences between countries and sectors.  
The following sections first look at the balance of influence between external 
bodies — the international financial institutions and donors — and national 
governments, and then consider interests and institutions at a national level, breaking 
these down into two categories: (1) the ‘principals’, that is the public and the 
politicians who in formal political theory would decide the priorities of government; 
and (2) the ‘agents’, that is the senior core government officials, the ministry level 
officials and professionals, and public sector workers, 
 
External ‘Agents’ and National ‘Principals’ 
 
Economic crisis was a key catalyst in bringing about reform in the case study 
countries. This is probably true always and everywhere, and not only in developing 
countries. Crisis both generates a need for change and also opens up ‘windows of 
opportunity’ by throwing the normal rules of the game into flux (Grindle and Thomas, 
1991; World Bank, 1997). There were internal reasons why collapses of government 
spending power should lead to radical proposals for change but, particularly in the 
case of the poorer countries studied here, these conditions also created a susceptibility 
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to external pressures. Among the strongest of these are the multilateral or 
international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 
which act not only on their own behalf but also as bodies that influence the agenda of 
bilateral donor agencies and the credit policies of commercial banks. They present 
themselves as ‘agents’ of nationally determined programmes. 
It is difficult to disentangle the contribution of the different internal and 
external actors in bringing about shifts in policy. However, in Ghana, Sri Lanka, India 
and Zimbabwe, multilateral lenders played a key role with bilateral donors in support. 
What is distinctive about the involvement of external actors in developing countries is 
that they come not just as advisors but as the financial sponsors of reform, which 
gives them much greater influence (Corkery et al., 1998). There are cases where 
reforms have been advanced in the absence of real local support, but few where the 
international agencies have not been present, even if only in the wings. However, 
governments are, of course, not without influence; the balance of power between 
external agencies and governments varies by country, service sector and the specific 
reform issue.  
Donor influence, even where local support is lacking, has been more readily 
asserted in the immediate reforms associated with stabilization — divestiture in 
industry, abolition of external trade controls, cuts in civil service expenditure. These 
were not so much elements of a sector-specific reform programme, but more of a 
response to the more general requirements of structural adjustment, orchestrated by 
the IMF and World Bank. Fiscal crises and the IMF’s stabilization package required 
the divestiture of state-owned enterprises, and the removal of controls on imports and 
prices. Aspects of agricultural marketing were also directly affected by IMF and 
World Bank conditions, particularly in the African countries where the crisis was 
deeper. Import controls and price subsidies were challenged, and swept away where 
the international financial institutions had sufficient influence; monopoly marketing 
boards were privatized, corporatized and lost their monopoly status (Hubbard, 2003). 
Many of these were ‘stroke-of-the-pen’ reforms whose implementation required little 
more than a change of policy. More complex were the ensuing ‘supply-side’ reforms 
designed to promote the development of market producers (Jackson 2002). 
The water sector was not immediately affected by structural adjustment 
programmes. It was initially bilateral donors that supported reforms leading to more 
efficient and equitable management of water resources. For example, in 1994, four 
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donor countries (Germany, The Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom) 
supported Zimbabwe’s development of a water resource management strategy. 
Together the bilateral donors and World Bank commissioned studies and supported 
proposals for pricing and structural reform in the water sector, although national 
leadership of the process was emphasized (Batley, 1998). However, by the end of the 
1990s a new international convention had developed, and governments everywhere 
were under pressure from the multilateral agencies to move towards concessions as a 
condition for further funding to the sector (Nickson and Franceys, 2003).  
In general, and beyond these particular case study countries, it took much 
longer for public management reform to affect state intervention in the social sectors 
of health and education. In these areas, the pressure of donors, the IMF and World 
Bank has been much more incremental. Certain aspects of reform in the social sectors 
could be introduced quickly and without real political support, as long as there was 
little organized political resistance — for example, rises in tariffs and introduction of 
user fees. But ‘second generation’ reforms in the organization and roles of 
government bodies, in changing attitudes towards, and the relationship with, the 
private sector required long term administrative and political commitment. This was 
particularly the case in the health and education sectors but also in water and 
sanitation. In these, the model being proposed by reformers was less readily available 
off-the-peg than in the economic sectors, and there were strong administrative and 
professional apparatuses to resist change (see also Nelson, 2000). 
The social sectors have been freer from the attention of the international 
financial organizations, and therefore generally slower to reform than macro-
economic and industrial policy. In the health sector, chronic fiscal crisis and then the 
new poverty agenda and sector-wide approaches of donors eventually forced re-
consideration of the role of the state, particularly in Africa. Pressure was greatest 
where the crisis was deepest, with the effect that there were more elaborate plans for 
reform in Zimbabwe and Ghana, and even in Thailand after the 1997 crisis, than in 
South Asia. Donors encouraged hospital autonomy in Ghana, Zimbabwe and 
Thailand, as well as user fees —particularly in Zimbabwe where fee increases formed 
part of the first structural adjustment programme — and contracting out of services, 
again particularly in Zimbabwe (Mills et al., 2001). 
Donors and international financial organizations have been fundamentally 
important actors in reform, most directly in the case of demand-side, stroke-of-the-
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pen, economic reforms. However, there were some cases where governments were the 
initiators of liberalizing reforms. Among the four core countries, this was most clearly 
the case in Sri Lanka which, in 1977, launched its own liberalization programme 
involving the privatization of state enterprises and the promotion of foreign inward 
investment. India has been a modest liberalizer but made its own decision for 
compliance with the terms of the World Trade Organization when, in 1995, it 
undertook a tariff reform that opened its previously highly protected textiles industry 
to imports. Among the reference countries, South Africa and Argentina launched 
programmes of reform in the early 1990s, backed by the international institutions but 
clearly primarily in response to internal dynamics — the end of apartheid, and 
political crisis arising from hyper-inflation, respectively. 
Even where the international financial institutions and bilateral donors 
asserted influence, governments were not powerless to modify or resist unwanted 
changes. The effect of health reforms was little more than ‘nibbling away at the 
fringes of the state, rather than fundamentally changing its role in health’; 
countervailing forces or inertia preserved the dominance of the state (Mills et al., 
2001). In spite of pressure from the IMF and World Bank for full liberalization of 
both the external and internal trade in cocoa, the Ghanaian government successfully 
defended its choice to move slowly so as to minimize the risk to farmers (Hubbard, 
2003).  
While governments were not powerless, the international financial institutions 
and donors were almost always a significant presence in policy determination, holding 
to question any straightforward relationship between national principals and national 
agents. IFIs and donors acted as a deus ex machina that produced policy extraneously, 
breaking the direct relationship between citizens, politicians and service providers. 
 
The Principal–Agency Characteristics of Services 
 
In exploring the role in the reform process of the nominal principals — the public (the 
citizen-consumer) and political leaders — and the nominal agents — public officials 
in core and line ministries or public bodies — the leading question is, who, in 
practice, is the principal? The agency problem is that the nominal agents frequently 
have little incentive to serve the goals of the nominal principals. 
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The incentives to responsive service delivery differ by sector, since the 
characteristics of sectors influence the capacity of actors — principals and agents — 
to organize and to assert control over each other. Drawing on the research in Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, India and Sri Lanka, Table 3 summarizes the balance of power between 
principals and agents in three service sectors. The table is schematic, ignoring the 
differences between country contexts, and grouping business development and 
agricultural services into one category for comparative purposes. It also ignores 
differences between parts of each service, for example, policy-making, financing, 
delivering and monitoring. The table identifies the capacity of control by principals 
and agents as being composed of the following factors: 
 
Control by Principals 
The capacity of client groups to organize is greater where: 
 the service is used regularly and predictably, not only in crisis; 
 the service is area-based. 
The capacity of clients to exercise influence is greater where they have: 
 information on the quality of the service; 
 choice about whether to use the service. 
Policy-makers’ capacity to control and incentivate provider organizations is greater 
where: 
 service provider’s effort and outcomes are measurable; 
 information on provider’s performance is available; 
 provider’s contract is specifiable and enforceable. 
 
Control by Agents 
The capacity of provider groups to organize is greater where: 
 the service has a high information or professional content; 
 professional organization is strong; 
 unionization is strong; 
 professions and unions ‘colonize’ agency; 
 contractors are large, few and have specific skills and assets. 
Agency structures that favour provider control are 
 monopolistic; 
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 led by professional staff 
 
The following sections set out the analysis in more detail, but Table 3 indicates the 
broad conclusion. Principals (clients and policy-makers) are weakest and the agents 
(the providers) are strongest in the case of curative health services. In urban water 
supply, there is a greater possibility of balance between the two sides. In business and 
agricultural services, the agent-providers have less possibility of dominating the 
principals. 
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Table 3. Principal-Agent Relationships by Service 
 
Capacity of Control by Principals Capacity of Control by Agents 
Service Capacity of client 
organization 
 
Capacity of clients 
to exercise 
influence 
Policy-makers’ control 
of performance 
Providers’ organization Agency structure 
Curative 
health 
Weak: Clients are 
scattered and use 
service in crisis. 
Weak: Information 
asymmetry limits 
choice, but 
alternative 
providers exist. 
Weak: Service effort and 
output difficult to assess; 
information asymmetry. 
Difficult to specify 
contract. 
Strong: Strong 
unionization and 
professional interests in 
direct provider 
organizations and 
ministry. Some major 
suppliers/contractors. 
Dominant: Large 
direct deliverers 
with high 
autonomy. 
Urban 
piped 
water 
Medium: Service is 
area-based and 
regular, facilitating 
client organization.  
Medium: Clients 
have information 
on service, but no 
alternative suppliers 
of piped water. 
Strong: Service effort 
and output is easy to 
measure and monitor. 
Relatively easy to specify 
contract. 
Medium/strong: 
Engineering dominates 
provider or ministry; 
moderate unionization; 
big contractor interests. 
Dominant: 
Monopolistic with 
a high degree of 
autonomy in 
management, or 
large contractor.  
Business 
and 
agriculture 
services 
Medium/Strong: 
Services are for 
specific user 
groups. Stronger in 
industry than 
agriculture. 
Strong: Users have 
choice about 
whether to use the 
service. 
Medium: Service effort 
and output difficult to 
assess; information 
asymmetry. Difficult to 
specify contract. 
Weak: Small 
organizations with a 
relatively weakly 
established professional 
base and low 
unionization. 
Weak: Non-
monopolistic. 
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The ‘Principals’ — Citizens and Political Leaders 
 
The Citizen-Consumer as Principal 
 
A fundamental first point with regard to the involvement of the public is that most of 
the reforms investigated here were of little direct interest to users or citizens in the 
case study countries. Managerial reforms — the decentralization of internal 
management, contracting out of functions, developing support and regulatory systems 
— were hardly likely to inspire public passion. Given a low level of public 
engagement with policy in the countries studied, reform generally remained within the 
‘bureaucratic arena’. Some reforms had a more immediate political impact, such as 
user fees, ‘privatization’ and the liberalization of markets. However, public demand 
for reform was rare; there was usually more pressure on politicians for the defence of 
existing rights and privileges than for change. 
In practice, with few exceptions, the public and particularly the poor, were 
largely outside the policy process. Producer groups (farmers, traders and 
industrialists) appeared sometimes as lobbyists against change. Consumers of social 
services generally represented an implicit (not organized) pressure on politicians to 
maintain existing rights. In most cases, consumers were the ‘silent stakeholders’ in 
reform. The research programme’s surveys of users’ opinion of health and water 
services in Ghana, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and India found strong critical opinion about 
the price and quality of the services but widespread ignorance about the proposals for 
reform of those sectors. The reform issue that did arouse much comment from 
respondents in the Ghana and Zimbabwe surveys was that of user fee and tariff rises 
(Rakodi, 2000).  
In spite of the failings of public services, the surveys showed that users 
accustomed to public sector provision generally supported its continuation and 
opposed alternative arrangements. This seemed to be based on a belief that 
entitlement to basic services could best be assured by governments, and on experience 
of privatizations which had left users worse off and with less say in decisions. 
Reforms have often threatened public institutions in which users have a basic 
confidence. Moreover, users have not been convinced that the reforms addressed their 
concerns about the low quality, queues, rationing, staff shortages and disrespect for 
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customers often associated with public services (Rakodi, 2000). In spite of these 
concerns, there were few instances in which surveyed attitudes were translated into 
active intervention in the policy process. 
 
Political Leaders 
 
Who then are donors’ local allies for change? We saw above that, in almost all cases, 
reform was associated with structural and sector adjustment programmes. Formally, 
therefore, governments had ‘bought in’ to the reforms, although they might often have 
little real commitment. This level of agreement, or at least acquiescence, was 
concentrated at the level of the president or prime minister and the key ministers, 
particularly ministers of finance. It was backed by core central agencies associated 
with the political leader, such as the public service commission and head of the civil 
service. The focus of reform leadership at the highest political level is noted also by 
Grindle (2003) and Nelson (2000). 
In the core case study countries in South Asia and Africa, political leadership 
at other levels — sector ministers, parliaments and individual politicians — rarely 
played an important role in advocating and driving through reforms, although it might 
obstruct them. There was often formal political tolerance of the reform process, 
combined with informal inertia or sabotage by politicians in the legislature and even 
in government. Sector ministers were not involved in reform design, apart from 
ratifying the proposals of the political leadership. The exceptions among the reference 
countries were Argentina and South Africa, where there were coherent party 
programmes and a broader-based political commitment to reform including among 
service sector ministers. In Ghana, ministers responsible for water under the Rawlings 
régime and under the current government argued for the private management of the 
Accra water supply but backed down in the face of the resistance of the powerful 
trade union and public mobilization (Larbi, 1998).
4
 
Political acquiescence may be enough to allow donors, together with other 
local actors, to initiate reform, but probably not to sustain it. Politicians outside the 
core executive, from both government and opposition, had more influence on the 
                                                          
4
 Mills (2002) identifies political leadership in reform in the case of the health sector in 
Zambia, South Africa and Colombia. See also Corkery et al. (1998); Nelson (2000); Grindle 
(2000, 2003) for examples of sectoral political leadership. 
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implementation than on the design of liberalizing reforms. Usually their position was 
negative, particularly where change was disruptive of the established distribution of 
benefits and systems of patronage.  
 
Sector Differences 
 
As indicated in Table 3, sector characteristics may affect the capacity of citizens and 
service clients to control the performance of service providers:  
1. Organization and definition of client groups: While agricultural marketing and 
business support services are oriented to production and apply to specific producer 
groups, health care and drinking water supply are consumer services applying to 
the general public. Water consumers are defined territorially and can organize on 
that basis, but health care users encounter the need for services individually and in 
a state of vulnerability. 
2. Exercise of choice and influence: The sectors are differentiated between those 
where users have some choice about whether to use services at all (agricultural 
and business support services); one (health care) where they have some choice 
about which public or private service provider to use but inadequate information 
on the quality of the alternatives; and one (piped water) where they may have little 
or no choice. 
3. Measurability of performance: Policy-makers and users have stronger possibilities 
of control where they have information about and can assess the performance of 
producers. Water supply is the most clearly quantifiable, tangible and measurable; 
health care, business and agricultural support are qualitative services with greater 
difficulty of performance measurement.  
 
These criteria indicate a scale of capacity of citizens and clients, as the ultimate 
principals, to control policy-makers, and for the latter to manage the performance of 
the provider organizations that are supposedly their agents. Industrial promotion and 
agricultural marketing services present the greater possibility of the recipient group 
organizing to demand services: first, industrial (and perhaps agricultural) producers 
are a definable group and, second, they have some choice about whether to apply for 
the service. Piped water supply services are typically monopolistic but, if they are 
supplied locally, consumers may organize territorially to hold providers to account for 
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measurable physical outputs. The weakest clients are those of curative health services 
who may have some choice but little information about how to exercise it and little 
capacity to organize. 
 Social pressures against change were most organized and articulate in the 
agricultural services sector. They were effective in slowing liberalization and the 
reduction of government subsidies, especially in South Asia where peasant farmers 
form an important political bloc and where the influence of the international financial 
institutions was less strong. In India, politicians face a line-up of support for the status 
quo — urban consumers, farmers capable of producing surplus, traders, millers, 
parastatal personnel and government officials. The political interest is in the defence 
of entrenched welfare rights rather than in the promotion of uncertain gains from freer 
trade and competitive markets. Politicians ‘aspire to be identified as the guardians of 
the poor’ (Hubbard, 2003: 46; see also Kohli and Smith, 1998). In Sri Lanka, where 
rice production employs around half the labour force, farmer protests had a powerful 
effect in slowing and limiting the liberalization of external trade and in reducing farm 
input subsidies. The Ghanaian government’s caution in following the World Bank and 
IMF proposals to open the cocoa trade can be attributed partly to the political 
sensitivity of exposing farmers to abrupt change. Zimbabwe was one of the few cases 
where there was a lobby (the large-scale commercial farmers) in favour of the 
liberalization of trade and privatization of agricultural services. However, the reforms 
received temporary political toleration rather than support and their gains were short-
lived. In 2001, under pressure of political and economic crisis, the government 
resorted to export prohibition and compulsory grain purchases at fixed prices to feed 
the population.  
Large portions of the population are typically outside the range of public water 
supplies. Even in the wealthiest of the countries studied, Argentina, in the early 1990s 
around 30 per cent of the population of Greater Buenos Aires lacked access to the 
public water supply and instead made their own illegal connections or developed their 
own water supply. During the previous five decades the viability of the water 
company had been undermined by party campaigns for a combination of low tariffs 
and politicized investment decisions. The excluded population depended on patronage 
to obtain water connections, while existing recipients benefited from the low tariffs. 
The political risks of radical change, in raising and collecting unpaid tariffs and in de-
politicizing investment decisions, were clear, while the gains from a more efficient 
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and extended supply system were long-term and uncertain. The patronage basis of 
decisions about urban water access was a major obstacle to management reform in all 
the core countries. Nickson and Franceys (2003:) describe a ‘low-level performance 
equilibrium’ between urban consumers and producers – a poor quality service is 
provided in exchange for a minimal tariff. 
Where consumers have organized to affect policy on urban water, it is to 
defend or improve existing arrangements. In Ghana a movement supported by 
international NGOs resisted the commodification of water through leases to foreign 
companies in Accra and Kisumu. In Cochabamba, Bolivia, riots led to the 
abandonment by the government of its concession of water management to a private 
company (Nickson and Vargas, 2002). In the major cities of Zimbabwe, residents’ 
associations have been active in pressing for improved services, though urban water 
supply is good by international standards. In Bulawayo: 
Widespread protests have been organized by residents’ associations, 
complaining not only about the service and its cost but also that meters were 
not being read properly but only estimated. Mass refusals to pay bills gave 
way to a pre-election moratorium granted by councillors on further payment of 
arrears while the matter was reviewed. This led quickly to a new attempt by 
councillors and officials to explain tariff levels. (Batley, 1998: 48)  
 
The high expectations of urban consumers in Zimbabwe seem to derive from a 
surprising combination of ideologies: the established expectations of the previous 
colonial population and the expectations raised by the redistributive policies of the 
post-colonial government. In addition, the fact that water is provided by local 
government in Zimbabwe offers a political focus for popular organization. As 
described below, radical reform to change the organization of water supply resulted 
not from public demand but from high-level political leadership that mobilized 
rumbling discontent into an awareness of crisis. 
The reform of health care was not generally driven by the political leadership 
or by sectoral ministers, nor was it supported by legislators. The health sector is 
complex, with multiple sub-sectors and services, and does not provide easy focuses 
for political or social mobilization for or against change. In the African countries 
where the reform proposals were most radical, they had been externally inspired so 
there was little sense of political ownership. In all countries, the initiators and 
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supporters of change among officials in the core government agencies, in the 
ministries of health and in international organizations regarded the support of 
politicians as very uncertain and unpredictable. Civil servants therefore proceeded 
opportunistically in the face of inconsistent policy direction: ‘politicians make ad hoc 
decisions, not rational for the health sector, and often change their minds; we have to 
cope with these decisions’ (Ministry of Health official in Sri Lanka, quoted in Russell 
and Attanayake, 1997: 82) 
 As in the water sector, health reform was more likely to bring political risk 
than gain. The risks were different for the various reforms. In Sri Lanka and India, 
decentralized management of hospitals would threaten the structure of political 
control and arouse the opposition of trade unions and health professionals. Politicians 
opposed user fees in all case study countries but particularly in Sri Lanka, where there 
was widespread commitment to free public health care among the middle classes as 
well as trade unions, the radical left, health professionals and managers. Pressure from 
donors for the introduction of charges was greater in the African countries, where 
public opposition was less mobilized and had fewer channels of expression (Herbst, 
1993). As Mills et al. (2001:  99) argue, ‘one-party politics and more limited 
democratic accountability meant that politicians were less fearful of an electoral 
backlash or the “political suicide” associated with fees in South Asia’.  
 There were very few cases of positive public pressure in favour of reform in 
health care. NGOs in India and the media in India and Thailand have campaigned for 
improved regulation of health care, but remained a weak counter-balance to the 
considerable professional and business interests lined up against regulation. In 
general, rather than press for change, users have found alternatives in the private or 
traditional sectors where the public health service was inadequate, choosing ‘exit’ 
rather than ‘voice’ (Mills et al., 2001).  
 
The ‘Agents’ — Public Service Administrators, Professionals and Workers 
 
International agencies thus had little guarantee of stable support for liberalizing 
reforms from government or politicians, citizens or users. As long as there was basic 
political acquiescence, relatively little support was necessary for the immediate policy 
reforms associated with structural adjustment — divestiture and de-regulation in the 
productive sectors, civil service cuts and one-off tariff rises. However, for the longer-
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term ‘supply-side’ reforms (in organizational structure and process, efficiency 
orientation, and changed relationships with the private sector) there was one group 
whose support was essential to the implementation of reform: the senior ministerial 
administrators and professionals. In formal terms, these are the ‘agents’ of citizens 
and politicians; in practice, together with the international agencies, they were often 
closer to being the ‘principals’.  
Where reform was successful, it had high level political and donor support and 
a working combination of senior officials and external advisers. Similarly, Grindle 
(2001, 2003) identifies the importance of small ‘design teams’ attached to the political 
executive, and Nelson (2000) of ‘change teams’. The initiators of change were usually 
outside the ministry that was subject to reform. Crisis and adjustment put into the 
driving seat the ministry of finance and agencies subject to the president’s or prime 
minister’s office, such as planning and public service commissions. They negotiated 
the commitment to the programmes of the World Bank, IMF and donors, reported to 
them, and had an across-the-board responsibility for liberalization and civil service 
cuts. Typically, where radical reform was really implemented, these core public 
officials led and were supported by top civil servants of the line ministries working 
with international advisers.
5
 The degree to which core officials were involved 
depended on the salience of the sector to macro-economic adjustment; there were also 
differences between sectors with regard to the respective roles of line ministry 
officials and professional staff. 
 The first wave of reform in the industrial sector, particularly in the African 
countries, was a direct consequence of IMF and World Bank conditionality — 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and the de-regulation of production and trade. 
Ministries of industry could not but comply, although they might procrastinate. It was 
the second wave of reforms that left room for the initiative of senior ministry officials. 
This was the development of a new raft of agencies and departmental units concerned 
with enabling, promoting and facilitating private industry. However, ministries of 
industry had previously performed mainly regulatory and licensing functions and 
found it difficult to step into the new roles of supporting industries that they had 
previously controlled (Jackson, 2002).  
                                                          
5
 Corkery et al. (1998) and Nelson (2000) note the importance for sustainability of reforms of 
involving line ministries, but that they are often excluded in programmes driven by 
stabilization and structural adjustment. 
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The influence of senior officials in the core institutions of government over the 
agricultural sector was weaker. State intervention in agriculture was less immediately 
exposed to structural adjustment and was defended, particularly in India, by its 
historical importance to national food security and to the needs of poor consumers and 
producers. Nevertheless, the driving forces for change in all the case study countries 
were again the core ministries of finance, planning commissions and presidential 
offices that were obliged to pursue agendas of cost-cutting and de-regulation in 
response to fiscal crisis. The sector ministries and agencies generally acted to restrain 
reform (Hubbard, 2003).  
 In the service sectors of water and health, core government officers, together 
with international agencies, were again the main initiators of change. Crisis and 
structural adjustment agreements set the broad policy agenda for shrinking budgets, 
staff cuts, raised tariffs and fees, contracting-out and privatization. However, unlike in 
agriculture and industry, where the most significant part of the reform was for state 
withdrawal, in water and health the state was bound to have a continuing role. Here, 
the development of detailed new management practices could not easily be directed 
from the public service commission, ministry of finance, president’s or prime 
minister’s office. Unless conditions could be created for an abrupt and radical transfer 
to private provision, new arrangements would have to be worked out incrementally 
within the public sector. In the latter case, the sectoral administrators and 
professionals had a necessarily strong role in reform, or in stopping it. Professional 
staff — engineers in water and doctors in health — were much more important in the 
direction of these sectors than they had been in ministries of industry and agriculture. 
Nelson (2000) comes to similar conclusions about the influence of education 
professionals in reform in Latin America. 
Radical reforms challenged the control of water supply by professional 
engineers and public administrators, in favour of the private sector and financial 
managers. Where radical proposals for water sector reform were successfully 
implemented, they were politically driven. In the case of Argentina, the new 
government of President Carlos Menem in 1989 declared its commitment to 
liberalization and reform of the state. A rapid programme of privatization of utilities 
culminated in 1992 with a State Reform law that spelled out future arrangements for 
gas, electricity and water, including the thirty-year concession of Buenos Aires’ water 
supply. Similarly, the president of the Philippines pushed through a concession 
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arrangement for Manila by demanding radical change in response to a declared ‘water 
crisis’. Both presidents managed to raise the political salience of sector reform, giving 
it a similar degree of urgency as had been assumed by macro-economic stabilization 
reforms.  
Incremental water sector reforms were often led by lower level alliances of 
water agency managers usually with, but sometimes without, the pressure of donors 
and their technical advisers. These generally retained existing professional 
(engineering) control while freeing agencies from the constraints of being part of 
government. At a national level, in Zimbabwe it was the professional staff of the 
Department of Water Resources who, in 1985, put the case to the cabinet for the 
corporatization of the state bulk water supply organization, as a way of escaping civil 
service controls on investment, management and recruitment. This meshed with 
World Bank structural adjustment and was supported by international consultants and 
donors, although the proposal always had weak political backing. A similar attempt to 
turn the Sri Lankan National Water Supply and Sewerage Board into a consumer-
oriented, cost-conscious organization, with USAID support, foundered on the 
resistance of leading engineers and central government politicians to the loss of their 
control to professional managers (Nickson and Franceys, 2003). 
Crisis and the adjustment programmes agreed by core government agencies 
with the international financial institutions indirectly affected the health sector, 
particularly in Africa. Health sector reform was often a spin-off from broader national 
commitments by public service commissions and ministries of finance to contracting-
out, staff cuts and the raising of user fees. For these to be operationalized, however, 
support was needed from the most senior officials of the ministry of health, usually 
with technical advisers of donor and international organizations. Such commitment 
was more forthcoming in Africa where donor influence was more complete and where 
economic and fiscal crises had led to a near collapse of health services. The charging 
of fees was accepted by doctors and managers in Zimbabwe and Ghana as a way of 
maintaining health spending, but rejected by their counterparts in Sri Lanka and India 
as an affront to free care (and perhaps as a threat to informal charging).  
Even where there was high-level commitment to reforms of this type, in 
practice there were major difficulties with implementation. Many of the proposed 
health reforms entailed a weakening of powerful internal interests and erosion of 
professional autonomy. Particularly in South Asia where health systems were 
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somewhat more secure, ministry officials commonly resisted decentralization of 
control to hospitals; contracting-out and privatization were resisted by unions; and the 
medical profession opposed the regulation of private practice in which it usually had a 
stake. The health sector was, in this respect, the most impervious to radical reform. It 
was not easily dealt with by the sort of ‘stroke-of-the-pen’ privatization that 
international agencies and some political leaders had demanded of the productive 
sectors or, in a few cases, water supply. Reformers had to persuade the medical 
professionals and public sector unions who saw change as a threat, who had a large 
place in the organization and delivery of health services, and who had an important 
political voice (Mills et al., 2001). 
 
EMERGING CONSTITUENCIES FOR CHANGE 
 
Reform was often constrained by lack of political commitment and by the interests 
embedded in existing organizational arrangements. Even where reforms were 
introduced, governments and public agencies could easily slip back into previous 
practices. However, in some cases, the first round of reform built up momentum for a 
further round of change, supported by the agents and beneficiaries of the reform 
process. Grindle (2001, 2003) and Nelson (2000) describe how educational and health 
reformers have achieved strategies of change in some Latin American countries by 
understanding the political constraints and opportunities. They have been able to 
calculate opportunistically to build alliances and outwit the opposition. This research 
also found some examples of how reform can sow the seeds of further change. 
Liberalization, the privatization of state enterprises and deregulation of 
industries and agricultural trade are unlikely to be reversed. They have created a new 
set of incentives for entrepreneurs and, sometimes, led to the creation of private and 
public support agencies whose services are in demand. In Sri Lanka, early 
encouragement of foreign direct investment created producer and consumer support 
for further liberalization to encourage foreign investment and employment. In 
Zimbabwe, textile firms and trade unions pressed for further freedom from 
government controls, and the private sector established its own new agricultural and 
industrial support services (Jackson, 2002). Government officials in Kenya who had 
opposed the removal of the state monopoly in maize marketing eventually came to 
support it after seeing its positive effects. The millers and traders who began to deal in 
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imported maize and rice in Kenya and Sri Lanka became a constituency for further 
liberalization. Urban consumers who benefited were a latent source of demands for 
the freeing of agricultural trade if it could deliver cheaper and better food (Hubbard, 
2003). 
The Argentinian government learned from earlier utility privatizations, 
developing a capacity for negotiation that led to better and clearer contracts in gas, 
electricity and water. Aguas Argentinas, the company that held the concession for 
water supply to Buenos Aires, overcame suspicion of the privatization of management 
by taking some quick steps to satisfy the opposition. It ensured early water 
connections to the previously excluded poorer population by cross-subsidies from 
other water consumers, and made contracts with communities to supply labour in 
return for earlier and cheaper connections. It also improved the conditions of 
employment of staff transferred from the public sector water company, and worked 
with NGOs and small local firms to build infrastructure and extend services (Nickson 
and Franceys, 2003).  
In the health sector, the development of capacity could also be cumulative: 
‘Once a degree of decentralisation has taken place and hospital staff have the 
opportunity to learn new systems and skills, there will be stronger systems and a pool 
of experienced staff in place which will be able to cope with greater degrees of 
decentralisation’ (Mills et al., 2001: 93). A key issue for reformers is then how to 
phase this development of skills and build constituencies of interest in favour of 
reform. One of the problems in the professionally-dominated sectors of health 
(doctors) and water (engineers) in developing countries was how to make the first 
incursion. Whereas in countries such as Britain, reformers could call on the support of 
financial and managerial staff (Ferlie et al., 1996: 7), in developing countries these 
groups are often weak. Reform might be phased to first build this management cadre 
as a core group of advocates of change. Secondly, organizational reform is likely to 
receive more support if it is dissociated from direct threats to the status of employees. 
Where re-organization was implemented after the earlier stages of structural 
adjustment were over, there was less likely to be resistance. Thus, Ghanaian health 
and water workers, no longer threatened by further major employment cuts, supported 
reforms which would decentralize control, introduce new sources of fee revenue and 
raise salaries. In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, health sector reforms were associated 
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with the general staff cuts and suppression of salaries of the earlier stages of structural 
adjustment, and were met with opposition or suspicion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The concern of this article has been to identify the leaders, the supporters and the 
resisters of public service reform. It has adopted a broad principal–agent framework, 
comparing reality with an ‘ideal’ situation in which citizens are the principals over 
political policy-makers as their agents, and policy-makers are the principals over 
public service officials as their agents. Public service reform is generally complicated 
by the fact that public service officials are both the agents and the objects of change. 
Reform in most developing countries is further complicated by an additional set of 
external actors in the shape of international financial institutions and donors.  
The analysis has identified the interests involved in reform, indicating how the 
balance between them is affected by institutional factors including: the importance of 
the statist model to the institutional stability of weaker states, the important role of 
international organizations in reform, in the context of economic and fiscal crises; and 
the effect of the characteristics of different service sectors on the power balance 
between clients, policy-makers and provider organizations. 
The first generation of reform in the 1980s and early 1990s, under the pressure 
of crisis and structural adjustment, focused on reforms concerned with macro-
economic stabilization. Several factors made for relatively quick implementation — 
the imminence of the financial crisis, the availability of ready-made models of neo-
liberal economic reform, and the ‘stroke-of-the pen’ nature of many of the policy 
changes. The more recent reforms in the organization of service delivery, particularly 
in health, education, water and sanitation present a much harder reform task. They 
have less clear-cut goals, offer uncertain benefits, involve multiple actors, challenge 
existing provider groups, and require long-term commitment. In the social sectors, 
citizen or client awareness and capacity to organize in order to press for improved 
services are weak, and policy-makers have relatively little capacity to assert control 
over the performance of providers. This is particularly the case in the health sector; 
infrastructural services (such as water) appear to offer greater opportunities for 
control by policy-makers over provider organizations. 
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A second point with regard to the nature of these reforms is that their concern 
with the organization of service delivery was of little direct interest to users or 
citizens. The struggle for change generally remained within the bureaucratic rather 
than the public arena. Where reform took place it was more often a covert, 
administrative rather than an overt, political process. As Grindle (2001: 31) has found 
in other studies, reform is generally an élite process: it is not public demands, the 
legislature or interest groups that define reform initiatives but 'small groups located in 
the executive'.  
Political leadership, where it existed, was concentrated at the highest levels — 
the president or prime minister and minister of finance. Otherwise, political 
engagement was usually weak and more often aimed at defending existing interests 
and arrangements. The political risks of promoting change were much greater and 
more certain than the possible gains. The interests of service recipients were more 
often experienced by policy-makers as a passive drag on change than as a source of 
active demands. Producer interests were more assertive than the consumers of health 
and water services. 
Paradoxically, it was normally the supposed ‘agents’ of the policy process 
who were the key leaders or ‘principals’ of change — international and key domestic 
officials. This was most clearly the case in the reforms directly associated with the 
conditionalities of structural adjustment such as privatization and de-regulation of the 
productive sectors, increases in tariffs and fees, and cuts in staffing. These could be 
driven through by international agencies with the acquiescence of political leaders and 
top officials of core ministries. The research shows that, by comparison with 
macroeconomic and industrial reform, there was much less high-level political and 
top official involvement in health and water reforms. Here, line ministry officials 
often had a key role in implementing change and were likely to let it lapse. 
Professional staff — engineers in water, doctors in health (and teachers in education) 
— are much more important in the direction of these sectors than they are in 
ministries of industry and agriculture, and are likely to have a continuing role 
whatever the reform (see also Nelson, 2000 on this point). Where social reform was 
more successful (for example, health care in Ghana), it was led by a small reform 
team that included donors, core ministry and line ministry officials with high level 
political support. 
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The deep involvement of international lenders or donors in the policy-making 
of countries in crisis can lead to the ventriloquizing of policy through national 
political leaders. This can give the impression of local ‘ownership’ of reform without 
substance, and can undermine the relationship of accountability between national 
citizens, policy-makers and providers — principals and agents. External bodies (IMF, 
World Bank and donors) have the greatest force with regard to the weakest 
governments, with the greatest dependence and the least capacity to negotiate. As a 
result, proposals for reform, including in the social and utility sectors, have often been 
most sweeping and radical in the countries with the deepest crises. The consequence 
has been a large gap between radical reform design and modest outcomes, particularly 
in Africa.  
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